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"The market mechanism fails to bring currencies back into alignment.  On the contrary, speculation
tends to exaggerate currency moves. ... [T]he system of freely floating currencies is cumulatively
destabilizing."
George Soros, The Alchemy of Finance, p328
1.  Introduction
With one trillion dollars per day, the weekly trading volume in the foreign exchange market
is five times larger than the annual volume of the world goods trade.
1  This gigantic asset market
also has enormous volatility. Contrary to the predictions of the monetary approach to exchange rate
determination, Flood and Rose (1995) showed that the floating exchange rate system after 1973 is
associated with substantially higher exchange rate volatility than the pre-1970 period, without any
discernible difference in the volatility of economic and policy fundamentals.  This suggests, though
does not prove, that the trading process itself may generate unnecessary volatility that is not based
on real information.  Even George Soros, who is known to have made a penny or two speculating in
the foreign exchange market, thinks that the answer is affirmative, as shown by the opening quote
of this paper.
Another nagging question about this market is whether there exists asymmetric information
among traders that may be price relevant.  The conventional answer has been no even though there
may be asymmetry between a central bank and traders. A recent paper by Lyons, Ito and Melvin
(1997) found that the intra-day pattern of exchange rate volatility changes after the Tokyo market
lifted its lunch-hour trading restrictions.  The authors interpreted the changes as a reflection of
asymmetric information in the market.
2  This question is important because the existence of
informational asymmetry would suggest that we should begin to focus more attention on exchange
                                                
1 Calculated based on information in Levich (1998), p69.
2 This interpretation, however, met some challenge during the Workshop on Microstructure at the 1997 NBER Summer
Institute.2
rate models in which traders are optimizing agents.  Such models are still rare in the international
finance literature.
In this paper, we study the behavior of very large market participants. We aim to shed light
on two questions.  First, does the trading/speculation by these very large participants tend to
stabilize or exacerbate exchange rate volatility?  Second, if any traders have better information,
these large participants likely do.  Does the data indicate that they actually have better information?
  The two questions are of course related: if the large players do not have better information about
future levels of exchange rate than the general public, it would be difficult for their trading positions
to stabilize the exchange rate.
We are not aware of any study of the first question on the foreign exchange market.  Lyons
(1997) provided an interesting model of large trading volume in the foreign exchange market, but
does not deal with its effect on volatility directly.  On the second questions, there were a number of
studies with inconclusive answers. VanBelle (1975, 1977), Eaker (1977), Mahajan and Mehta
(1986, 1984) and So (1994) found that banks’ currency positions in spot and swaps seem to
demonstrate some ability to make correct predictions of the exchange rate.  Using monthly data,
Fieleke (1981) found that both bank and nonbank positions performed poorly as forecasters of
exchange rates.  He found that the position takers in his study generally failed to earn even a gross
return on their positions.  The problem with these studies is that their data did not include certain
important derivative products, namely options.  In other words, an important part of the market
participants’ overall currency positions was missing.  For the large players in our sample, for
example, the net options positions over 1994-96 were over 25% of the total positions in spot,
forward and futures. And this missing part has grown rapidly in importance relative to other
currency products. A data set that covers options and thus provides a more comprehensive
description of currency positions should offer more reliable inferences.
We make use of a data set recently collected and released by the U.S. Treasury.  This data
set has two important advantages over those in the earlier papers.  First, it gives a more complete
description of the market participants’ positions by including information on options and other
derivatives positions in addition to spot trading.  Second, it is of relatively higher frequency (i.e.,
weekly positions). 3
On the first question, we note first that speculation, ex ante, is just as likely to reduce as to
increase volatility. Friedman (1953) provided the classic argument for stabilizing speculation. His
logic is (maybe deceptively) simple: destabilizing speculators lose money on average and would be
driven out of the market eventually. On the other hand, recent models of noise trading (Kyle, 1985;
Delong, Shleifer, Summers and Waldman, 1990a and 1990b) provided a host of reasons why non-
rational noise traders may not disappear from the market (i.e., they could earn higher expected
returns for unknowingly bearing extra risk, and new generations of noise traders come to market
continuously). Furthermore, rational speculators may take destabilizing positions in the presence of
noise traders using feedback rules.
The rapid development of the derivatives markets, particularly that of currency options, 
coincides with an increase in the volatility. Of course, the direction of causality can, in principle, go
either way. However, many people seem convinced that the use of derivatives has contributed to the
increased volatility.  As a former central banker told the Wall Street Journal,
3 Amost foreign-
exchange traders now take it for granted that once in a while you will get a little extra kick in the
price movement from a large number of options in the market.@  George Soros was reported to have
compared the destabilizing effects of currency options to >crack= cocaine and called for greater
regulation of currency derivatives.
4
Empirical work on the effect of currency derivatives on exchange rate volatility is lacking,
in part, because of unavailability of data on derivatives usage. Studies of this question for other
financial markets have reached apparently conflicting conclusions.  We will later list these studies
and offer a possibly unifying interpretation. Due to the same data availability problem, empirical
studies of  asymmetric information in the foreign exchange market are rare.
5
We organize the paper in the following way.  Section 2 explains the data. Section 3
investigates whether large participants= positions in foreign exchange are systematically associated
                                                
3 AEconomy: Treasurers of Many Multinational Firms Took Risks to Profit from Falling Dollars,@ by Fred R. Bleakley,
The Wall Street Journal, April 17, 1995, Section A, page 2.
4
 ADo Knock-Out Options Need to be Knocked Out?@ by Michael R. Sesit and Laura Jereski, The Wall Street Journal, May
5, 1995, Section C, page 1.
5 Richard Lyons (1995) made headway in studying the microstructure of the market by obtaining the order flow
information of one trader for a week.  Norman Fieleke (1981) made the first study of the forecasting ability of large
U.S. firms by using their monthly currency positions released by the U.S. Treasury.  His data set did not include
positions in options and other derivatives.4
with subsequent change in exchange rate volatility, and if so, what a plausible causality story should
be.  Section 4 turns attention to whether large participants= positions reflect their superior ability to
forecast the level of exchange rate, using both parametric and non-parametric approaches. Section 5
provides concluding remarks.
2. Data
Large participants’ foreign exchange position
Data on the foreign exchange positions by large market participants come from the
Treasury Bulletin, which, in September 1994, began publishing weekly time-series data on
aggregate currency holdings by major foreign exchange market participants in the U.S.
Major foreign exchange participants are defined as those with more than $50 billion
equivalent in foreign exchange contracts on the last business day of any calendar quarter during the
previous year.  According to authors’ phone conversations with Treasury officials in charge of the
data collection, in 1996, there were thirty-six entities that qualified as major participants.  Of them,
twenty-nine were commercial banks and the remaining seven were other forms of financial
institutions.  In accordance with law (31 U.S.C. 5315; 31 C.F.R. 128, Subpart C), weekly and
monthly reports must be filed throughout the calendar year by these participants.
An important feature of these filings is that they include the derivative positions,
specifically, the outstanding amounts of foreign exchange forward,  futures and swaps contracts
bought and sold,  and one half the notional amount of foreign exchange options,  in addition to spot
contracts.  Previous Treasury data released not only were of lower (i.e., monthly) frequency, but
also omitted derivative positions which have become increasingly important over time.
The data are disaggregated by currencies but not by participants. The currencies covered
include the British Sterling, Swiss Franc, Japanese Yen, German Deutschemark and Canadian
Dollar.  Weekly position data is available only since January 5, 1994.  Thus, the sample period of
this paper is from that day through December 25, 1996.  A shortcoming of the data set is that it only
reports net but not gross positions.
Table 1 presents summary statistics. Suppose that a corporate customer asks a major
participant (say a commercial bank) to buy 100 million D-marks, and the bank turns around to buy5
the foreign currency from the foreign exchange market. This bank will report two transactions to
the Treasury: a purchase of 100 million D-marks from the market, and a sale of 100 million D-
marks to the corporate customer. Table 1 indicates that the major participants buy and sell a large
amount with relatively small net positions. This could reflect a combination of two things: they act
as intermediaries in the market; and they close out most of the speculative positions within a week
(if not by the end of a day). 
Exchange rates and volatility
Daily exchange rate data used for this study was obtained from the DRI database (FACS).
We use offer rates at the close of the London market. For the purpose of this paper, using the
middle point of the bid-ask rates, or using rates at a different time of the day would not make a
difference.
   Volatility measures were calculated by taking the standard deviation of daily returns (i.e.,
first difference in log exchange rates) over various time horizons (1, 2, 4, and 12-weeks).
3.  Position-Taking by Large Participants and Volatility of Exchange Rates
In this section, we investigate the relationship between position-taking by large participants
and exchange rate volatility. Since options have been singled out as a particularly menacing culprit
as discussed in the introductory section of the paper, we start with large participants= positions in
options. Because options are only reported in terms of delta equivalent values,
6 we will examine
only the relationship between the absolute value of the net delta equivalents and exchange rate
volatility.
The effect of options trading on the volatility of underlying spot market has been an
obsession  in studies of other financial market.  The results appear to be conflicting and confusing. 
Those who  studied the effect of listing of individual stock options generally found that they are
associated with a reduction in subsequent stock price volatility (e.g., Hayes and Tennenbaum, 1979;
Ma and Rao, 1988; Bansal, Pruitt and Wei, 1989; Skinner, 1989; Conrad, 1989; Nabar and Park,
                                                
6 The delta equivalent value is the product of the first derivative of the option value with respect to the spot exchange
rate (according to the Black-Scholes formula) multiplied by the notional principal of the contract.6
1989; and Damodaran and Lim, 1991a).  Those who studied the listing of individual commodity
options also found a  reduction in subsequent commodity price volatility (Working, 1960, in onion
markets; Powers, 1970, in pork belly and live beef; and Cox, 1976, in a number of commodity
markets).  On the other hand, those who studied the effect of stock index options usually found an
increase in the underlying stock price volatility (e.g., Stoll, 1987; Harris, 1989b; Damodaran, 1990;
and Blume, MacKinlay and Terker,
1989).  Similarly, studies of the GNMA market found that the options tend to either increase the
volatility of the underlying prices (Figlewski, 1981; and Edwards, 1988a) or have no (statistically
significant) effect (Simpson and Ireland, 1982; Corgel and Gay, 1984; and Moriarty and Tosini,
1985).
These apparently conflicting findings have a possible unifying interpretation.  In those
markets (e.g., individual stocks and commodities) where asymmetric information is prevalent
(between insiders and uninformed traders), introduction of options can bring out new information
more quickly and, if this effect dominates, it can reduce the volatility of the underlying prices.  In
those markets where asymmetric information is negligible such as stock index or GNMA, options
trading tends to mainly augment the speculative positions of noise traders or other uninformed
traders, and hence raise the underlying price volatility.  If we accept the conventional view that
asymmetric information is negligible among foreign exchange traders, this interpretation would
suggest that options trading may exacerbate foreign exchange volatility.  On the other hand, if we
subscribe to the alternative view as advocated by Lyons, Ito and Melvin (1997), we may expect a
negative association between options and volatility in the foreign exchange market.
Options Positions and Exchange Rate Volatility
We employ Granger-causality tests to examine the relationship between the absolute value
of the options positions by large participants and exchange rate volatility.  The tests are conducted
on the pooled-sample as well as on five individual currencies, and for four different horizons (one,
two, four and twelve weeks).7
A typical specification is the following linear vector autoregression (VAR):
      VOLt = AL OPTt + BL VOLt + ,vol,t
OPTt = CL OPTt + DL VOLt + ,fcp,t
where OPT, the absolute value of the delta equivalent of the net outstanding foreign currency
options contracts at the time of the survey (subsequently referred to as "options positions" for
short); VOL is exchange rate volatility over a relevant time horizon; and AL, BL, CL, and DL are
one-sided lag polynomials.
To test for Granger causality from options position (OPT) to volatility (VOL), in this
framework, a standard joint test of exclusion restrictions (F-test) is used to determine whether
lagged OPT has significant predictive power for current VOL.  The null hypothesis that OPT does
not Granger-cause VOL is rejected if the coefficients on AL are jointly significantly different from
zero.  We test for Granger causality from VOL to OPT in a similar manner. To determine the
appropriate lag lengths for the lag polynomials, we minimize the Schwarz Bayesian Information
Criterion (SBIC).
Table 2 reports the results of the Granger tests.  Lag lengths and computed F-statistics with
their significance levels are reported as well.  For the pooled sample on top of the table, we can
reject the null of non-causality from options positions to subsequent exchange rate volatility at the
five percent level for all four horizons (the middle column).  On the other hand, we cannot reject
the null of non-causality in the reverse direction at the five percent level for all four horizons (the
right column). With somewhat weaker power, this same pattern carries over to four out of five
currencies and for one, two and four week horizons.
It is useful to stress that Granger-causality is not the same thing as economic causality. 
Table 2 has not established that the options trading by large participants causes more volatility in
the foreign exchange rate.  It does establish that the option trading tends to lead to, in a time
sequence sense, a subsequent increase in volatility.
Could this finding simply reflect the possibility that large traders have good information
about the subsequent movement in the exchange rate volatility, and they adjust their options
positions in anticipation of the movement?  While it is difficult to give a definitive answer, we
make a few observations.  First, if the large participants truly have good information about future8
exchange rate volatility, they can in principle take advantage of it without any change in the net
delta value of the options, for example, by simultaneously buying and selling calls and puts with the
strike price equal to the current spot price (known as a straddle).  Thus, options trading based on
good information about future volatility may not necessarily induce a positive correlation between
options positions and subsequent volatility.
Second, if options trading is executed to take advantage of information about future
volatility, there is no reason that positions in the spot, forward and futures contracts should be
positively related to subsequent exchange rate volatility.  On the other hand, if both derivatives and
spot contracts are employed to speculate on the level of the exchange rate movement, and if the
trading is based on noises rather than information, it is possible to find a positive correlation
between positions in spot, forward and futures, and subsequent exchange rate volatility.  For this
reason, we take a look at the  association between these two variables.
Positions in Spot, Futures and Forward and Exchange Rate Volatility
Table 3 presents the results of bivariate Granger-causality tests between positions in spot,
futures and forward (which we shall call "spot positions" in this subsection for short) and exchange
rate volatility.  In the pooled sample,  we can reject, at the five percent level, the null hypothesis of
no causality from spot positions to exchange rate volatility at the one, two and four week horizons
(the middle column).  But we cannot reject no-causality from exchange rate volatility to spot
positions. This pattern is broadly repeated for each of the five individual currencies.  Thus, the data
reveals that increases in the absolute value of the positions in spot, forward and futures are
associated with increases in the subsequent exchange rate volatility, but not the other way around.
We also conduct Granger-causality tests between the absolute value of positions in all
products (spot, futures, forward and options) and exchange rate volatility (reported in Table 4). 
Naturally, we find exactly the same pattern as in Tables 2 and 3.  This similarity in patterns across
positions in different currency products suggests that the options positions (together with positions
in other products) cannot be entirely taken because of good information about future volatility. 
They are likely taken, at least in part, to speculate on the level of exchange rate movements.9
4. Large Participants' Ability to Forecast the Level (First Moment) of Exchange Rate
The last paragraph naturally leads to the following question: Do large market participants
have better abilities to forecast the level (the first moment) of exchange rates? We investigate this
question using two methods: a regression and a non-parametric approaches.
It is useful to point out that all we can hope to test is a union of two observationally
equivalent
hypotheses: (a) Large participants have superior information about exchange rate movement so that
they buy (sell) on average when they anticipate a subsequent rise (fall) in the value of foreign
currency;
and (b) Large participants have sufficient market power so that their action of purchase (sale) on
average generates a rise (fall) in the value of foreign currency.  In other words, if we find that
subsequent appreciation of the exchange rate is predicted by large participants= current  net purchase
of the foreign currency, either or both hypothesis can be true.  On the other hand, if we fail to find
the positive correlation, neither can be true.
We should also note that given the nature of our data, we cannot test if the large participants
have superior ability to forecast exchange rate movement within a day.  Nor can we test if a subset
of the participants in our sample have superior forecasting ability.
Parametric Approach:  Regression Analysis
We begin with the following regression specification:
S(t+1) - S(t) = " + $ FCP(t) + ,(t+1).
where S(t) is the exchange rate (value of foreign currency in units of domestic currency) at the end
of week t, and FCP(t) is defined as the net foreign currency position (purchase) of the large
participants at the end of week t.  Either the better information hypothesis or the market power
hypothesis would imply that $ > 0.
The results are given in Table 5.  The regressions on a pooled sample of  all five currencies
(top panel) show that, over almost all horizons (1 day, 2 days, 5 days, 1 week, 2 weeks, and 4
weeks), we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient on the foreign currency variable is10
zero even at the ten percent level.  The only exception is for the 12-week horizon where the slope
estimate has a wrong sign.
Disaggregating by currency, essentially the same pattern prevails for four out of the five
currencies. The only exception is Japanese yen where a positive slope coefficient is observed for
most of the horizons.
The overall results demonstrate that, at least for four out of the five currencies, the large
participants as a group do not have better information on a systematic basis about the movement in
the level of exchange rate, nor do they appear to possess a significant market power that alters the
movement of the exchange rates to make their expectations self-fulfilling.
Non-parametric Approach: The Henriksson-Merton Test
The regression analysis in the last subsection examines the correlation between the
magnitude of exchange rate appreciation with the size of foreign currency positions. Now we turn
to a non-parametric approach developed by Henriksson and Merton (1981).  There are two reasons
for this approach.  First, the inference in the regression analysis assumed that exchange rate changes
follow a normal distribution.  This assumption is not supported by evidence (McFarland, Pettit, and
Sung, 1982; So, 1987).  The non-parametric approach relieves us of the need to make the normality
assumption.  Second, if we maintain the normality assumption, we may view the hypothesis tested
by the non-parametric approach as a weaker one: the direction (not magnitude) of currency
appreciation may be correlated with a buy decision (regardless of the size of the buy). 
Let R(t) denote the return on an investment from week t to week t+1, R(t) = S(t+1) - S(t),
then, define
p1(t) = prob [FCP(t) < 0 | R(t) < 0]     and
p2(t) = prob [FCP(t) > 0 | R(t) > 0].
Thus, p1(t)and p2(t) describe the conditional probabilities of a correct position given that the
currency in question decreases or increases subsequently in value, relative to the U.S. dollar.
Henriksson and Merton (1981) show that a necessary and sufficient condition for a forecast (or in
this case, large participants= position) to have predictive value, is that the sum of conditional11
probabilities p1(t) + p2(t) must be significantly greater than 1.  The position has no predictive value
if actual and predicted returns are distributed independently, resulting in p1(t) + p2(t) = 1.
The test is implemented by classifying a sample of N observed positions and outcomes in
the following manner:
Actual Returns
R(t) < 0 R(t) > 0
Predicted Returns BPi(t) < 0 n1 N2 - n2




     N1 = total number of outcomes with R(t) < 0;
    N2 = total number of outcomes with R(t) > 0;
    n1 = number of correct forecasts given R(t) < 0;




    n = number of times forecaster predicts that R(t) < 0, or n = n1 + N2 - n2 ;
    N = N1 + N2 = total number of observations.
  
Then, under the null hypothesis that position takers do not have superior forecasting abilities (or
do not act in a stabilizing manner), the probability distribution of n1 (the number of correct forecasts
given that R(t) < 0) is characterized by the following hypergeometric distribution and is
independent of both p1(t)and p2(t):
  





















Therefore, to test the null hypothesis, it is unnecessary to directly estimate either of the conditional
probabilities, p1(t)and p2(t).  Provided that N1, N2 and n are observable, the distribution of n1 is
given above, with the feasible range for n1 given by:
n1   0, n  -  N2     n1      N1, n     n1 ” £ £ ” max { } min { } 00
Using the above equations to establish confidence intervals for testing the null hypothesis, a
one-tail test (or at least one that weights the right-hand tail much more heavily than the left) is more
appropriate than a two-tail test: if the market participants (i.e., forecasters) are rational, then it
should not be true that p1(t)+ p2(t) < 1. Thus, given a confidence level of C, one could reject the null
hypothesis of no forecasting ability if n1 > x*(C) where x*(C) is the solution to:
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For large sample sizes, it may be cumbersome to do the factorial computations, particularly
when N1 . N2.  Fortunately, it is for precisely these cases where N1 . N2 and where the sample
sizes are large, that the hypergeometric distribution can be accurately approximated by a normal
distribution.  In these cases, we can use the following hypergeometric means and variances as
parameters to the normal approximation:
    E(n1) = n*N1/N  ,
    F
2 (n1) = [n*N1*(N - n1)*(N - n)] / [N2*(N - 1)].
We apply the non-parametric test to our data.  And the results are presented in Table 7.  In the
pooled-sample (top panel), we found that we can reject the hypothesis of no predictive power at the
five percent level for 1-day, 2-day and 2-week horizons, but fail to reject for the 5-day, 1 week, 2-13
week, 4-week and 12-week horizons.  When we go into disaggregated samples (i.e., currency by
currency), the rejections are less frequent.  There is no single currency for which we can reject the
hypothesis of no predictive power at the five percent level for more than one horizon.  Neither is
there a horizon for which we can reject the hypothesis for more than one currency.
Thus, even for the less demanding task of forecasting the direction of exchange rate changes,
not their magnitude, large participants= positions have at most some weak power.
One may imagine that if the currency positions of the large participants do not forecast
subsequent direction of the foreign currency appreciation, maybe their adjustment, i.e., changes in
the currency positions, does.  Table 7 reports the results of such tests.  If anything, the results are
even less favorable to the large participants= forecasting ability.
  
5.  Conclusion
Using a newly released data set by the U.S. Treasury, we investigate the relationship between
foreign currency positions, including those of the derivatives, taken by very large market
participants, and exchange rate movement.
There are several important findings.  First, both the absolute value of the options positions and
the absolute value of the spot, forward and futures positions are positively correlated with a
subsequent increase in exchange rate volatility.  This suggests that position-taking by large market
participants is likely to have contributed to an increase in the exchange rate volatility.
Second, a regression analysis suggests that position-taking by large participants does not help to
forecast subsequent appreciation of the exchange rate.  A non-parametric approach indicates that
large participants are not likely to have a systematic ability to forecast even the direction, let alone
the magnitude, of the exchange rate movement.  These findings are inconsistent either with the14
hypothesis that large participants have superior information about exchange rate movement, or with
the hypothesis that they have market power so that their purchases of foreign currencies tend to
raise their value.15
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Table 1 -  Summary Statistics:  Foreign Currency Positions of Major Market Participants
(weekly data - Jan. 5, 1994 through Dec. 25, 1996)
1994 1995 1996 1994-1996
Mean Std Dev Min Max Mean Std Dev Min Max Mean Std Dev Min Max Mean Std Dev Min Max
British Sterling
Purchased 405,572 42,275 340,047 502,539 514,590 39,623 443,259 594,596 480,951 51,466 421,112 631,782 467,038 63,774 340,047 631,782
Sold 404,338 40,158 339,643 497,642 510,039 39,575 440,035 588,774 476,022 49,649 418,732 623,446 463,466 61,729 339,643 623,446
Net Options Position 539 621 -819 2,122 828 774 -870 2,285 1,344 1,261 -1,638 3,190 904 979 -1,638 3,190
Net Foreign Curr. Pos. 1,773 2,536 -3,844 8,778 5,380 1,735 2,197 10,879 6,273 2,438 2,904 12,829 4,475 2,978 -3,844 12,829
Swiss Franc
Purchased 278,729 13,277 248,045 310,557 292,266 16,075 255,308 346,499 346,149 46,457 266,064 449,494 304,816 40,826 248,045 449,494
Sold 281,308 13,984 250,315 313,851 297,591 16,091 260,540 350,581 355,847 49,227 271,383 458,437 310,588 43,957 250,315 458,437
Net Options Position 1,844 938 588 4,120 4,259 1,504 1,642 6,530 6,801 1,591 4,134 10,378 4,236 2,441 588 10,378
Net Foreign Curr. Pos. -735 1,544 -3,079 4,551 -1,065 1,341 -3,950 1,096 -2,897 4,562 -28,254 3,730 -1,537 2,978 -28,254 4,551
Japanese Yen
Purchased 1,174,884 129,819 862,888 1,337,054 1,312,536 58,531 1,199,145 1,468,428 1,271,913 45,341 1,199,114 1,399,273 1,253,111 103,465 862,888 1,468,428
Sold 1,191,411 134,236 874,875 1,365,093 1,336,203 57,870 1,224,818 1,490,934 1,296,519 47,154 1,216,101 1,417,403 1,274,711 107,324 874,875 1,490,934
Net Options Position 6,911 3,193 2,817 13,502 10,577 1,492 7,271 13,510 7,637 1,889 3,178 11,570 8,375 2,791 2,817 13,510
Net Foreign Curr. Pos. -9,617 4,426 -19,010 -1,063 -13,090 3,328 -22,279 -3,708 -16,970 5,400 -26,547 -7,961 -13,226 5,363 -26,547 -1,063
GermanDeutschemark
Purchased 1,232,485 98,380 1,067,557 1,437,706 1,258,810 101,758 1,034,980 1,550,656 1,147,923 73,983 1,026,553 1,306,086 1,213,073 103,173 1,026,553 1,550,656
Sold 1,240,520 98,152 1,076,488 1,444,947 1,248,017 101,838 1,025,430 1,540,893 1,152,835 73,145 1,030,836 1,309,379 1,213,791 101,103 1,025,430 1,540,893
Net Options Position 7,420 1,454 4,011 10,187 6,670 2,158 2,391 9,855 4,560 2,544 -1,731 9,856 6,217 2,415 -1,731 10,187
Net Foreign Curr. Pos. -615 3,391 -6,499 8,726 17,463 3,610 11,528 25,362 -353 4,134 -7,607 10,780 5,499 9,260 -7,607 25,362
Canadian Dollar
Purchased 119,390 10,986 98,309 131,709 157,294 19,529 125,835 204,780 143,738 8,775 130,058 161,527 144,295 20,009 98,309 204,780
Sold 116,396 11,377 94,216 129,758 152,145 18,955 123,918 198,939 139,770 8,285 125,667 156,359 140,047 19,193 94,216 198,939
Net Options Position -1,307 606 -2,206 201 -1,642 629 -2,557 -103 -2,384 439 -3,211 -1,638 -1,868 704 -3,211 201
Net Foreign Curr. Pos. 1,687 679 261 2,823 3,507 1,490 956 6,462 1,583 1,138 -956 3,668 2,380 1,532 -956 6,462
Notes:
Purchased and Sold refers to spot, forward, and future contracts purchased and sold, respectively, in that currency.
Net Options Position is the net delta-equivalent value of the total options position.  The delta-equivalent value is defined as the product of the first partial derivative of an option valuation formula times the notional
principle of contract.
Net foreign currency position is defined as Purchased - Sold + Net Options Position.
All values above are in millions of U.S. dollars.20
Table  2 -  Currency Options Positions and
Exchange Rate Volatility:  Granger Causality Tests.
(major market participants, weekly, 1/5/94 - 12/25/96)
H0: Foreign Currency Options
Positions Do Not Cause
Exchange Rate Volatility.
H0:  Exchange Rate Volatility













1 - week 726 3 2.22** 20.60 0.00 0.99 1.51 0.21
2 - weeks 712 5 0.92** 6.67 0.00 0.99 1.06 0.38
4 - weeks 712 5 0.42** 3.21 0.01 0.99 0.82 0.54
12 - weeks 641 13 0.11* 1.75 0.05 0.99 0.64 0.82
UK Sterling Pound
1 - week 154 2 2.79** 13.66 0.00 0.95# 2.85 0.06
2 - weeks 153 3 1.14** 4.19 0.01 0.96* 3.30 0.02
4 - weeks 154 2 0.71* 4.29 0.02 0.96 1.58 0.21
12 - weeks 151 2 0.14 1.05 0.35 0.95# 2.80 0.06
Swiss Franc
1 - week 142 4 3.20** 4.44 0.00 1.00 0.93 0.45
2 - weeks 142 4 2.20** 3.70 0.01 0.99 0.57 0.69
4 - weeks 140 5 0.66 0.96 0.45 0.99 1.00 0.42
12 - weeks 145 1 0.20 1.59 0.21 0.99 2.23 0.14
Japanese Yen
1 - week 155 1 4.63** 63.40 0.00 1.00 0.36 0.55
2 - weeks 155 1 2.06** 22.87 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.97
4 - weeks 155 1 0.82** 8.29 0.01 1.00 0.04 0.84
12 - weeks 152 1 0.19 1.75 0.19 1.00 0.06 0.81
German D-mark
1 - week 154 2 3.66** 16.91 0.00 1.00 0.26 0.77
2 - weeks 154 2 2.19** 13.41 0.00 1.00 0.48 0.62
4 - weeks 154 2 0.92** 5.67 0.00 1.00 0.07 0.93
12 - weeks 151 2 0.17 0.90 0.41 0.99 0.34 0.71
Canadian Dollar
1 - week 127 1 1.94** 42.47 0.00 0.99 1.03 0.31
2 - weeks 125 2 1.32** 14.24 0.00 0.99 1.45 0.24
4 - weeks 127 1 0.38** 7.46 0.01 1.00 0.25 0.62
12 - weeks 122 2 0.09 2.03 0.14 0.99# 2.87 0.06
Notes:
1) **, *, # denote significance at one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively.
2) Lag lengths are determined by minimizing Schwartz-Bayes Information Criterion (SBIC).
3) Sum of coefficients in column 4 are multiplied by 10
4.21
Table 3 - Spot, Forward & Futures Positions and
Exchange Rate Volatility:  Granger Causality Tests.
(major market participants, weekly, 1/5/94 - 12/25/96)
H0:  Spot, Forward & Futures
Positions Do Not Cause
Exchange Rate Volatility.
H0: Exchange Rate Volatility
Does Not Cause Spot,












1 - week 740 8 1.15** 2.57 0.01 1.00 0.60 0.78
2 - weeks 745 7 0.72** 3.44 0.00 1.00 0.70 0.67
4 - weeks 745 7 0.41** 3.20 0.00 1.00 0.29 0.96
12 - weeks 700 13 0.09 1.20 0.27 1.00 0.75 0.71
UK Sterling Pound
1 - week 154 2 3.24** 19.23 0.00 0.99 0.46 0.63
2 - weeks 153 3 1.54** 5.43 0.00 0.98 0.84 0.48
4 - weeks 149 7 0.66# 1.78 0.10 1.00 0.41 0.90
12 - weeks 151 2 0.19 1.65 0.20 0.96 1.50 0.23
Swiss Franc
1 - week 154 2 4.32** 15.41 0.00 1.00 0.06 0.94
2 - weeks 154 2 2.65** 12.90 0.00 1.00 0.11 0.89
4 - weeks 151 5 0.74 1.60 0.17 1.00 0.14 0.98
12 - weeks 151 2 0.22 1.08 0.34 0.99 0.43 0.65
Japanese Yen
1 - week 154 2 3.25** 14.33 0.00 1.00 1.88 0.16
2 - weeks 153 3 1.24* 3.01 0.03 1.00 1.78 0.15
4 - weeks 154 2 0.75* 4.15 0.02 1.00 0.85 0.43
12 - weeks 151 2 0.17 1.03 0.36 1.00 0.34 0.71
German D-mark
1 - week 154 2 3.60** 16.10 0.00 0.99 0.58 0.56
2 - weeks 154 2 2.06** 11.06 0.00 0.99 0.13 0.88
4 - weeks 155 1 0.76** 7.93 0.01 0.97 2.02 0.16
12 - weeks 152 1 0.09 0.62 0.43 0.97 2.73 0.10
Canadian Dollar
1 - week 154 2 2.03** 20.78 0.00 1.00 0.59 0.56
2 - weeks 154 2 1.44** 21.70 0.00 1.00 0.29 0.75
4 - weeks 154 2 0.51** 6.87 0.00 0.99 0.39 0.68
12 - weeks 151 2 0.10 1.65 0.20 0.99 0.33 0.72
Notes:
1) **, *, # denote significance at one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively.
2) Lag lengths are determined by minimizing Schwartz-Bayes Information Criterion (SBIC).
3) Sum of coefficients in column 4 are multiplied by 10
4.22
Table  4 -  Total Currency Positions and
Exchange Rate Volatility:  Granger Causality Tests.
(major market participants, weekly, 1/5/94 - 12/25/96)
H0:  Total Currency Positions 
Do Not Cause Exchange Rate
Volatility.
H0:  Exchange Rate Volatility 













1 - week 712 5 1.91** 7.92 0.00 1.00 1.06 0.38
2 - weeks 712 5 0.89** 5.26 0.00 1.00 0.20 0.96
4 - weeks 712 5 0.42** 3.20 0.01 1.00 0.67 0.65
12 - weeks 641 13 0.09 1.38 0.16 1.00 1.55 0.09
UK Sterling Pound
1 - week 152 4 2.79** 7.26 0.00 0.99 1.00 0.41
2 - weeks 153 3 1.35** 7.35 0.00 0.98 1.09 0.35
4 - weeks 151 5 0.52 1.26 0.29 0.99 0.25 0.94
12 - weeks 150 3 0.16 1.96 0.12 0.97 0.72 0.54
Swiss Franc
1 - week 144 3 3.92** 5.49 0.00 1.00 1.87 0.14
2 - weeks 144 3 2.43** 4.80 0.00 0.99 0.55 0.65
4 - weeks 140 5 1.29# 1.99 0.08 1.04 0.74 0.59
12 - weeks 141 3 0.45 1.65 0.18 0.95 1.92 0.13
Japanese Yen
1 - week 154 2 3.35** 14.23 0.00 0.99 1.64 0.20
2 - weeks 151 5 0.90 1.59 0.17 1.00 1.70 0.14
4 - weeks 151 5 0.50 1.02 0.41 1.00 0.82 0.54
12 - weeks 151 2 0.17 0.85 0.43 1.00 0.32 0.73
German D-mark
1 - week 154 2 4.11** 19.67 0.00 0.97 1.49 0.23
2 - weeks 154 2 2.60** 14.93 0.00 0.96 1.32 0.27
4 - weeks 151 5 0.77# 1.91 0.10 0.98 0.45 0.81
12 - weeks 151 2 0.21 1.02 0.36 0.93 2.11 0.13
Canadian Dollar
1 - week 123 3 1.99** 7.18 0.00 1.01 0.30 0.83
2 - weeks 123 3 1.20** 5.52 0.00 1.00 0.41 0.75
4 - weeks 119 5 0.37 1.03 0.41 0.99 0.11 0.99
12 - weeks 120 3 0.15 1.19 0.32 0.98 0.74 0.53
Notes:
1)      **, *, # denote significance at one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively.
2)      Lag lengths are determined by minimizing Schwartz-Bayes Information Criterion (SBIC).
Sum of coefficients in column 4 are multiplied by 10
4.23
Table  5 -  Parametric Test:
Foreign Exchange Rate Returns and Net Foreign Currency Position
(major market participants, weekly, 1/5/94 - 12/25/96)
Dependent Variable: ln(Spot t+1 ) - ln(Spot t)
1-day 2-days 5-days 1-week 2-weeks 4-weeks 12-weeks
Pooled Sample
Intercept -33.1 -14.8 -13.3 24.1 41.5 -40.2 -2624.1
(18.2) (9.5) (8.4) (40.5) (61.0) (57.6) (3092.1)
Net Foreign -0.04 0.01 -0.1 -0.01 0.1 1.4 -9.4
Currency Position (0.2) (0.3) (0.4) (0.5) (0.7) (1.1) (5.6)
 # Obs. 736 728 681 737 732 732 729
Std. Err. Of Reg. 0.004 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.011 0.016 0.094
Adj. R
2 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.35 0.35 -0.03
Durbin-Watson 1.98 2.08 2.06 2.07 1.08 0.57 0.30  British Pound
Intercept 17.0 14.8 24.5 26.7 39.1 38.9 407.1**
(9.5) (14.5) (18.8) (22.7) (30.6) (40.3) (129.8)
Net Foreign -1.9 -0.8 -2.5 -3.3 -3.9 1.7 -111.0*
Currency Position (1.7) (2.6) (3.5) (4.7) (6.7) (9.3) (50.7)
 # Obs. 155 152 141 154 153 153 153
Std. Err. Of Reg. 0.007 0.010 0.013 0.015 0.021 0.028 0.140
Adj. R
2 0.0002 -0.006 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.006 0.043
Durbin-Watson 1.97 2.17 2.20 2.05 1.11 0.64 0.30 Swiss Franc
Intercept -2.0 6.3 11.5 11.6 24.0 40.5 51.5
(5.2) (7.7) (9.2) (10.5) (15.3) (21.0) (67.9)
Net Foreign 0.9 1.8 3.1 2.7 6.0 9.2 108.2
Currency Position (0.9) (1.3) (1.9) (2.8) (4.9) (5.3) (57.0)
 # Obs. 146 146 138 148 147 147 147
Std. Err. Of Reg. 0.006 0.009 0.010 0.012 0.017 0.025 0.112
Adj. R
2 -0.005 -0.003 0.002 -0.003 0.004 0.005 0.069
Durbin-Watson 2.06 2.01 1.88 1.99 1.00 0.51 0.33 Japanese Yen
Intercept 0.02 0.2 0.6* 0.8** 1.4** 2.8** -53.1
(0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.3) (0.4) (0.6) (45.6)
Net Foreign 0.002 0.02 0.04* 0.1** 0.1** 0.2** -12.5
Currency Position (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (7.8)
 # Obs. 155 152 142 154 153 153 153
Std. Err. Of Reg. 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.079
Adj. R
2 -0.006 -0.0005 0.018 0.036 0.059 0.100 0.001
Durbin-Watson 2.01 1.77 1.82 1.93 0.81 0.39 0.35 German D-mark
Intercept -2.6 -0.05 2.2 2.0 4.3 11.2 72.9*
(2.6) (4.3) (5.8) (6.7) (9.4) (13.0) (31.3)
Net Foreign 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.8 1.1 -2.5
Currency Position (0.4) (0.6) (0.7) (0.8) (1.1) (1.9) (2.8)
 # Obs. 153 152 142 154 153 153 153
Std. Err. Of Reg. 0.004 0.006 0.007 0.009 0.012 0.018 0.035
Adj. R
2 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.002
Durbin-Watson 2.04 2.16 2.01 2.04 1.01 0.53 0.31 Canadian Dollar
Intercept -0.1 3.1 0.8 0.7 8.6 7.2 44.1*
(2.3) (3.4) (5.1) (6.0) (8.5) (13.5) (21.2)
Net Foreign -0.9 -1.5 -0.8 0.2 -2.6 -0.3 -13.6*
Currency Position (1.0) (1.3) (2.4) (2.7) (3.5) (4.5) (6.8)
 # Obs. 127 126 118 127 126 126 123
Std. Err. Of Reg. 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.009 0.013
Adj. R
2 -0.002 0.001 -0.007 -0.008 -0.004 -0.008 0.017
Notes:
1)  ** and * denote significance at one and five percent levels, respectively.
2)  Coefficients for Intercept and Net Foreign Currency Position are multiplied by 10
4 and 10
7, respectively.
3)  Panel regression includes currency and time (week) dummy variables, not reported here.24
Table  6 - Non-Parametric Tests:  Conditional Probability of a
Correct Net Foreign Currency Position.
Currency Time Horizon
(# of days)
N N1 N2 P1(t) + P2(t) = P(t)
All Currencies
1 736 379 357 0.51 0.55 1.06*
2 728 373 355 0.53 0.57 1.10**
5 681 343 338 0.48 0.52 1.01
7 (1-week) 737 365 372 0.47 0.52 0.99
14 (2-weeks) 732 351 381 0.52 0.56 1.08*
28 (4-weeks) 732 346 386 0.51 0.55 1.05
84 (12-weeks) 729 368 361 0.47 0.51 0.98
British Pound
1 155 65 90 0.12 0.96 1.08*
2 152 68 84 0.09 0.93 1.02
5 141 68 73 0.07 0.90 0.98
7 (1-week) 154 64 90 0.06 0.91 0.97
14 (2-weeks) 153 63 90 0.08 0.92 1.00
28 (4-weeks) 153 68 85 0.09 0.93 1.02
84 (12-weeks) 153 69 84 0.03 0.88 0.91
Swiss Franc
1 146 83 63 0.82 0.19 1.01
2 146 77 69 0.87 0.26 1.13*
5 138 66 72 0.80 0.19 1.00
7 (1-week) 148 70 78 0.81 0.21 1.02
14 (2-weeks) 147 67 80 0.85 0.24 1.09
28 (4-weeks) 147 63 84 0.86 0.24 1.10
84 (12-weeks) 147 72 75 0.83 0.23 1.06
Japanese Yen
1 155 78 77 1.00 0.00 1.00
2 152 88 64 1.00 0.00 1.00
5 142 75 67 1.00 0.00 1.00
7 (1-week) 154 81 73 1.00 0.00 1.00
14 (2-weeks) 153 88 65 1.00 0.00 1.00
28 (4-weeks) 153 85 68 1.00 0.00 1.00
84 (12-weeks) 153 90 63 1.00 0.00 1.00
German Deutschemark
1 153 83 70 0.45 0.64 1.09
2 152 74 78 0.47 0.64 1.11
5 142 73 69 0.44 0.62 1.06
7 (1-week) 154 82 72 0.35 0.54 0.90
14 (2-weeks) 153 68 85 0.44 0.62 1.07
28 (4-weeks) 153 68 85 0.44 0.62 1.07
84 (12-weeks) 153 79 74 0.28 0.45 0.72
Canadian Dollar
1 127 70 57 0.03 0.95 0.98
2 126 66 60 0.03 0.95 0.98
5 118 61 57 0.02 0.95 0.96
7 (1-week) 127 68 59 0.01 0.93 0.95
14 (2-weeks) 126 65 61 0.03 0.95 0.98
28 (4-weeks) 126 62 64 0.00 0.92 0.92
84 (12-weeks) 123 58 65 0.00 0.92 0.92
Notes:
1)  ** and * denote confidence levels of 1 percent and 5 percent, respectively, using a one-tailed test.
2)  Null hypothesis is that the combined conditional probabilities equals one,  H0 : P1 (t) + P2 (t) = 1.00.
3)  N = total number of observations;  N1 = number  of observations where S(t+1) - S(t) < 0;  N2 = number of observations where
S(t+1) - S(t) > 0;  P1(t) is the conditional probability of a correct position given S(t+1) - S(t) < 0;  P2(t) is the conditional probability
of a correct position given S(t+1) - S(t) > 0.25
Table  7 - Non-Parametric Tests:  Conditional Probability of a
Correct Change in Net Foreign Currency Position
Currency Time Horizon
(# of days)
N N1 N2 P1(t) + P2(t) = P(t)
All Currencies
1 729 374 355 0.50 0.44 0.94
2 721 370 351 0.49 0.43 0.92
5 674 341 333 0.52 0.47 0.98
7 (1-week) 730 364 366 0.51 0.45 0.96
14 (2-weeks) 725 349 376 0.54 0.48 1.02
28 (4-weeks) 725 344 381 0.54 0.48 1.01
84 (12-weeks) 722 366 356 0.54 0.48 1.02
British Pound
1 154 64 90.00 0.44 0.44 0.88
2 151 68 83 0.52 0.52 1.03
5 140 68 72 0.53 0.53 1.06
7 (1-week) 153 64 89 0.48 0.47 0.96
14 (2-weeks) 152 63 89 0.44 0.45 0.89
28 (4-weeks) 152 68 84 0.53 0.50 1.03
84 (12-weeks) 152 68 84 0.50 0.49 0.99
Swiss Franc
1 144 82 62 0.57 0.44 1.01
2 144 76 68 0.50 0.34 0.84
5 136 66 70 0.55 0.43 0.97
7 (1-week) 146 70 76 0.53 0.38 0.91
14 (2-weeks) 145 67 78 0.61 0.45 1.06
28 (4-weeks) 145 63 82 0.54 0.40 0.94
84 (12-weeks) 145 71 74 0.61 0.45 1.05
Japanese Yen
1 154 78 76 0.44 0.46 0.90
2 151 88 63 0.43 0.43 0.86
5 141 75 66 0.39 0.41 0.80
7 (1-week) 153 81 72 0.46 0.47 0.93
14 (2-weeks) 152 88 64 0.51 0.55 1.06
28 (4-weeks) 152 85 67 0.49 0.54 1.03
84 (12-weeks) 152 90 62 0.48 0.52 0.99
German Deutschemark
1 152 82 70 0.57 0.40 0.97
2 151 74 77 0.55 0.38 0.93
5 141 73 68 0.62 0.43 1.04
7 (1-week) 153 82 71 0.59 0.41 0.99
14 (2-weeks) 152 67 85 0.67 0.47 1.14*
28 (4-weeks) 152 68 84 0.62 0.44 1.06
84 (12-weeks) 152 79 73 0.61 0.43 1.03
Canadian Dollar
1 125 68 57 0.46 0.46 0.91
2 124 64 60 0.45 0.48 0.94
5 116 59 57 0.51 0.54 1.05
7 (1-week) 125 67 58 0.51 0.52 1.03
14 (2-weeks) 124 64 60 0.48 0.50 0.98
28 (4-weeks) 124 60 64 0.50 0.52 1.02
84 (12-weeks) 121 58 63 0.50 0.52 1.02
Notes:
1)  ** and * denote confidence levels of 1 percent and 5 percent, respectively, using a one-tailed test.
2)  Null hypothesis is that the combined conditional probabilities equals one,  H0 : P1 (t) + P2 (t) = 1.00.
3)  N = total number of observations;  N1 = number  of observations where S(t+1) - S(t) < 0;  N2 = number of observations where
S(t+1) - S(t) > 0;  P1(t) is the conditional probability of a correct position given S(t+1) - S(t) < 0;  P2(t) is the conditional probability
of a correct position given S(t+1) - S(t) > 0.